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Abstract: Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with
the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get.
In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem
a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a correspondence between classical
bargaining solutions and usual claims rules. In particular, we show that the constrained
equal losses, the truncated constrained equal losses and the contested garment (Babylonian
Talmud) rules can be obtained throughout the Nash bargaining solution.
Keywords: bargaining problem; conflicting claims problem; proportionality; bargaining
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1. Introduction
As pointed out by [1–3], although the literature about conflicting claims problems, which originates
in a fundamental paper by [4], proposes a vast number of rules, “the proportional solution is the most
widely used”. The main reason is the fact that a proportional sharing allows individuals to compare the
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treatment afforded to each one, in terms of the proportion of the claim that is honored. Moreover, the
principle behind this proportional point of view is that the obtained amount per unit of individual claim
(or other proportion defining variable) is the same for all.
An interesting interpretation of proportionality, when analyzing conflicting claims problems, can be
found in [5]: “(...) A few years ago I developed what appears to be a new viewpoint which leads to
the proportional solution. Since the amount E is not enough to pay off the bankruptcy, one might adopt
the following point of view: Instead of giving the claimants less than they are entitled to now, one can
postpone paying them off and wait until the available money E grows, by investing it at the current
interest rate until the invested amount plus interest totals the amount being claimed. The judge at this
future point in time would pay off each claimant his/her full amount. Using the well-known accounting
principle of computing the present value of this future asset we can see what amount of money this
approach would yield each claimant today. If one does the algebra involved, one sees that the solution
is the same as the proportional solution. (...)"
According to this proportional concern, we transform a conflicting claims problem pE, cq into
a claims-in-proportions bargaining problem pSpE, cq, dq, by associating to each allocation x, a new
variable p P SpE, cq, where pi is the proportion of the claim ci that agent i receives, xi “ pici. Then,
we define the associated bargaining-in-proportions approach. It turns out that well known claims rules
can, in this fashion, be described by classical bargaining solutions. For instance, if we apply the Nash
bargaining solution [6], we observe that (i) it provides the same allocation when applied to the problem
pSpE, cq, dq, and when applied directly to the conflicting claims problem pE, cq; and (ii) it coincides
with the constrained equal awards rule [7]. Nevertheless, in general bargaining solutions do not coincide
when applied to problems pSpE, cq, dq and pE, cq. Then, we analyze how a claims rule ϕ and a bargaining
solution F in the following diagram are related.
pE, cq
pSpE, cq, dq
x
p
ϕ
F
In particular, we show that the egalitarian [8] bargaining solution corresponds with the proportional
rule, whereas when considering different reference points r the Nash solution provides the constrained
equal losses, the truncated constrained equal losses, and the contested garment (Babylonian Talmud)
rules in conflicting claims problems.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the main definitions on conflicting claims and
bargaining problems. Section 3 defines our model and presents the results about the correspondence
between claims rules and bargaining solutions. Finally, Section 4 closes the paper with some remarks.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Conflicting Claims Problems and Rules
Consider a set of individuals N “ t1, 2, ..., nu. Each individual is identified by her claim, ci, i P N ,
on some endowment E. A conflicting claims problem appears whenever the endowment is not enough
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to satisfy all the individuals’ claims; that is,
nř
i“1
ci ą E. The pair pE, cq P R ˆ Rn represents the
conflicting claims problem, and we will denote by B the set of all conflicting claims problems. A claims
rule is a single valued function ϕ : B Ñ Rn` such that: 0 ď ϕipE, cq ď ci, @i P N (non-negativity and
claim-boundedness); and
nř
i“1
ϕipE, cq “ E (efficiency). We now present briefly the rules used throughout
the paper. The reader is referred to [2,9] for reviews of this literature.
The proportional rule recommends a distribution of the endowment which is proportional to the
claims, PipE, cq ” λci, where λ “ Eř
iPN ci
.
The constrained equal awards rule (Maimonides, 12th century) proposes equal awards to all agents
subject to no one receives more than her claim, CEAipE, cq ” min tci, µu , where µ is such thatř
iPN min tci, µu “ E.
The constrained equal losses rule (discussed by Maimonides [10]) proposes equal losses to all agents
subject to no one receives a negative amount, CELipE, cq ” max t0, ci ´ µu , where µ is such thatř
iPN max t0, ci ´ µu “ E.
Given a claims rule ϕ, the associated truncated by the endowment claims rule ϕT is defined by
ϕT pE, cq ” ϕpE, cT q, where cTi “ mintci, Eu.
The adjusted proportional rule [11], which a generalization of the contested garment
principle (Babylonian Talmud), recommends the allocation APipE, cq ” vi`
´
E ´řnj“1 vj¯
cTi ´ viřn
j“1pcTj ´ vjq
, where vi “ maxt0, E ´řk‰i cku.
2.2. Bargaining Problems and Solutions
A bargaining problem is a pair pS, dq, such that S Ď Rn` is a subset in the n´dimensional Euclidean
space, and d is a point in intpSq, which is called disagreement point. Furthermore, we consider the set S
is convex, bounded, closed from above and comprehensive. Note that S is comprehensive inRn` if x P S,
0 ď y ď x, implies y P S. Given a bargaining problem pS, dq its individually rational Pareto boundary
is defined by BP pS, dq “ tx˚ P S : xi ě di and yi ą xi @i ñ y R Su. The ideal point a represents
the maximum amount that each agent can achieve in such a problem: aipS q ” maxtxi|x P Su, for each
i P N. A bargaining solution F assigns to each bargaining problem pS, dq a unique element F pS, dq P S.
For additional information, the interested reader is referred to [12].
The Nash solution [6] NpS, dq is the point maximizing the product of utility gains from the
disagreement point upxq “śni“1pxi ´ diq in BP pS, dq.
The Egalitarian solution [8] EpS, dq selects the maximal point of S at which all agents’ utility gains
are equal, i.e., the intersection point of the line throughout d with gradient 1 and BP pS, dq.
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution [13] KSpS, dq selects the point in BP pS, dq at which the agents’
gains are proportional to their ideal situation, i.e., the intersection point of the line throughout a and d
and BP pS, dq.
The Nash α-asymmetric solution, α “ pα1, α2, . . . , αnq ([14,15] ) ANαpS, dq is the point that
maximizes the function upxq “śni“1pxi ´ diqαi in BP pSq.
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Given a point r “ pr1, r2, . . . , rnq such that r ě a, the Nash from the reference point r solution [16]
N rpS, dq is the point that maximizes the function upxq “śni“1pri ´ xiq in BP pS, dq.
3. Bargaining-In-Proportions: Correspondence between Bargaining Solutions and Claims Rules
The bargaining-in-proportions problem pSpE, cq,0q associated to a conflicting claims problem pE, cq
is defined by considering the proportion of the claim that each agent is willing to disclaim. So, if we
name pi the proportion of her claim that individual i receives, the set of feasible claims can be written as:
SpE, cq “ tpp1, p2, . . . , pnq : pi P r0, 1s,
nÿ
i“1
cipi ď Eu.
when there is no confusion, we will denote this set simply by S. Observe that if pp1˚ , p2˚ , ..., pn˚q is a
solution in the bargaining-in-proportions problem pSpE, cq,0q, then it induces a solution in the claims
problem pE, cq, xi˚ “ pi˚ ci.
We name utopia point the ideal point in this transformed problem; that is, the point u “
pu1, u2, . . . , unq P Rn such that for each i P N, ui “ min t1, E{ciu . Furthermore, we call maximum
point to the unitary vector 1“ p1, 1, . . . , 1q P Rn that represents the maximum proportion of the claim
that an individual may expect to obtain before knowing the actual endowment E.
The next example provides an illustration, and relates the CEA rule with the Nash solution.
Example 1. Consider the three person conflicting claims problem defined by pE, cq “
p100, p20, 70, 110qq. Then, CEApE, cq “ p20, 40, 40q. The associated bargaining-in-proportions set
is defined by S “ tpp1, p2, p3q P R3 : pi P r0, 1s, 20p1 ` 70p2 ` 110p3 ď 100u. The Nash bargaining
solution in pS,0q is, NpS,0q “ p1, 4{7, 4{11q that induces the proposal p20, 40, 40q. Therefore, the Nash
bargaining solution corresponds with the one given by the CEA rule.
Proposition 1. The following correspondences between solutions and rules hold:
1. NpS,0q and CEApE, cq.
2. ANα“cpS,0q and P pE, cq.
3. EpS,0q and P pE, cq.
4. KSpS,0q and P T pE, cq.
5. KSpS,wq and AP pE, cq, for wi “ vi
ci
, and vi “ maxt0, E ´řk‰i cku.
Proof. See Appendix.
The AP rule is a generalization of the CG principle (Babylonian Talmud). This particular case, that
involves just two individuals, can also be obtained throughout the Nash solution from point w.
Proposition 2. For n “ 2, NpS,wq corresponds with CGpE, cq.
Proof. See Appendix.
Finally, the next result shows that the Nash bargaining solution (i) from the maximum point
corresponds to CEL rule, and (ii) from the utopia point provides the CELT rule.
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Proposition 3. The following correspondences between Nash solutions and claims rules hold:
1. N r“1pS,0q and CELpE, cq.
2. N r“upS,0q and CELT pE, cq.
The proof runs parallel to the one in Proposition 1 part (1).
4. Final remarks
In this work we build a connection between bargaining solutions and claims rules in a new scenario
where the relevant notions about what the involved individuals discuss are the proportions of their claims
that are (or are not) satisfied. Moreover, this new approach would allow to define new claims rules by
using well known bargaining solutions.
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Appendix
A1: Proof of Proposition 1 part (1)
Let pE, cq be a conflicting claims problem and pS,0q its associated bargaining-in-proportions problem. We proceed by
rounds until all pi come lower than the unit. In the first round, the associated Nash bargaining Lagrangian is
L “
źn
j“1 pj ` λ
´
E ´
ÿn
j“1 pjcj
¯
,
with 0 ď pj ď 1. After some algebra on the first order conditions, we obtain pi “ E{nci for each i P N. If for each i we
have pi ď 1, we stop and xi “ pici “ E{n, for each i P N, is the induced solution in the conflicting claims problem, that
coincides in this case with the CEA. Otherwise, for each pi ą 1 in the first optimization round, we set pi “ 1. Let N1 be the
set of individuals i such that pi “ 1 (individual i claim is fully satisfied). Let n1 be the cardinality of this set, n1 “ #pN1q.
In the second round, the associated Lagrangian with the condition pi “ 1 for each i P N1 is,
L “
ź
jRN1 pj ` λ
´
E ´
ÿ
jPN1 cj ´
ÿ
jRN1 pjcj
¯
,
with 0 ď pj ď 1 for j R N1. After some algebra on the first order conditions we obtain
pi “
´
E ´
ÿ
jPN1 cj
¯
{ pn´ n1q ci @i R N1.
If for each i R N1 we have pi ď 1, we stop and the induced solution in the conflicting claims problem is xi “ pici “
min tci, piciu for each i P N, that coincides in this case with the CEA rule.
Games 2015, 6 37
Otherwise we proceed one more time. The process stops after at most m ď n rounds, since at least one individual does
not obtain his full claim. Then, after m rounds
xi “ pici “ min
#
ci,
E ´řjPYm´1k“1 Nk cj
n´řm´1k“1 nk
+
for each i P N,
which is the CEA rule .

A2: Proof of Proposition 1 part (2)
Let pE, cq be a conflicting claims problem and pS,0q its associated bargaining problem from a proportional approach. We
follow a similar reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1 part (1), but now the problem is
max
p
źn
i“1 ppiq
ci
subject to ÿn
i“1 pici “ E; 0 ď pi ď 1, for each i,
where ci is the claim of the individual i. The solution to this problem is pi “ E{řni“1 ci for all i, so, 0 ă pi ă 1 for
each i, which is not a corner solution, therefore, xi “ pici “ ciE{řni“1 ci, which coincides with the P rule.

A3: Proof of Proposition 1 part (3)
It can be obtained straightforwardly.
A4: Proof of Proposition 1 part (4)
Let pE, cq be a conflicting claims problem and pS,0q its associated bargaining problem from a proportional approach. If
ci ď E, for each i P N, then a “ 1 and KSpS,0q “ EpS,0q, and from Proposition 1 part (3) we know that it induces
P pE, cq which, in this case, coincides with PT pE, cq. If, on the contrary, there is some k P N such that ck ą E (and
then cr ą E, for each r ą k), then a “ p1, . . . , 1, E{ck, . . . , E{cnq. In this case, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution implies
pi “ p1, for i ă k, and pj “ pE{cjqp1, for j ě k. This result coincides with the one of applying the egalitarian solution to
the problem pE, cT q, that induces PT pE, cq.

A5: Proof of Proposition 1 part (5)
It can be obtained straightforwardly from Proposition 1 part (4). Note that w P intpSq.
A6: Proof of Proposition 2
Let pE, cq be a conflicting claims problem and pS,0q its associated bargaining problem from a proportional approach. It
is easy to check that the Nash solution applied to the problem pS,wq is
p1 “ E ´ pv2 ´ v1q
2c1
, p2 “ E ` pv2 ´ v1q
2c2
,
and then, the induced solution in the conflicting claims problem x1 “ c1p1, x2 “ c2p2 coincides with CGpE, pc1, c2qq.

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